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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ( 
vs. ) 
SHERRILL Z. CHESNUT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9258 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 5th day of February, 1960, the District Court 
in and for the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Utah, 
County of Sevier, denied the motion of the State of Utah 
for an order to show cause as to the defendant, Sherrill Z. 
Chesnut, respondent herein, said motion having been filed 
by the District Attorney for the Sixth Judicial District. 
This brief submitted herein is in support of an appeal by 
the Attorney General of the State of Utah from such order 
of the District Court in and for the Sixth Judicial District, 
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and is taken under and pursuant to Section 77-39-4, U. C. A. 
1953, which states in part: 
''An appeal may be taken by the state: 
"* * * 
"(3) From an order made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the state. * * *" 
As a condition precedent to a discussion and develop-
ment of the substantive law surrounding this appeal, it is, 
of course, a necessity to set forth the facts which serve as 
a basis for such discussion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to a commitment, an information was filed 
on the 12th day of November, 1959, by the District Attorney 
for Sevier County, charging the respondent herein with the 
commission of acts against the State of Utah, to wit: Sec-
ond Degree Burglary and Grand Larceny. The respondent, 
on the 7th day of December, 1959, after a continuance from 
December 3, 1959, plead "not guilty" to both counts and 
the case was set down for trial. On the 5th day of January, 
1960, the respondent appeared before the court, withdrew 
his plea of "not guilty," and substituted in place thereof 
the plea of "guilty to both counts" (R. 21 & 22). Having 
been advised by Chesnut that he would waive the time re-
quired by statute (see 77-35-1, U. C. A. 1953) for the pro-
nouncement of judgment, the court entered judgment and 
sentenced the respondent in the Prison of the State of Utah 
for a term of not less than one year nor more than 20 years 
on the count of second degree burglary, and for a term of 
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not less than one year nor more than 10 years for the crime 
of grand larceny, said sentences to run concurrently. 
The court thereupon suspended execution of the sen-
tence in accordance with 77-35-17, U. C. A. 1953, and placed 
the respondent on probation. In doing so the court stated: 
"The Court, however, in this case, suspends 
execution of sentence for a period at this time of 
sixty days until March 14, 1960, at the hour of 2 :00 
o'clock p. m. This suspension is on condition that 
you remain under the custody and supervision of 
your bondsman, Mr. McCarthy, and that except with 
his consent, I will say, that you remain outside of 
Sevier County, except with Mr. McCarthy's consent 
or in case you are summoned to appear here at any 
time in court and you will be required to appear, 
however, on March 14th and for such further action 
as the court might see fit to take. 
"I will say frankly, this is a chance to make 
good without having to serve time in State Prison 
and if you make good on this, why there will be fur-
ther extensions until you will have an opportunity 
to clear yourself of the matter, but that will depend 
on you entirely, of course. Vv-re want to give you 
this opportunity rather than to require you to serve, 
except if it becomes imperative, I will say. We see 
no other reasonable way, so we feel that everybody 
involved in this is doing it for what we feel is your 
best interest and that you will be duly appreciative 
of it and make every effort to make entirely good. 
Not only with us, but with your bondsman and 
everybody concerned, so at this time you are re-
leased to your bondsman and the bond will remain 
in force as it now is" (R. 22-23). 
Subsequently, on or about the 4th day of February, 1960, 
the District Attorney for Sevier County filed with the court 
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a motion for an order to show cause why the suspension 
of the execution of sentence should not be terminated and 
incarceration follow forthwith. Attached to said motion 
were affidavits of two peace officers of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, the general context of the affidavits 
being that this respondent had admitted to each of them 
his direct implication in a burglary in Salt Lake City on or 
about January 26, 1960. The District Court, after a con-
sideration of the motion for the order to show cause and 
the affidavits upon which such motion was predicated, 
denied the District Attorney's request on the bases that: 
" ( 1) That the attempted probation arrange-
n1ent entered into in connection with said Stay of 
Execution was not within the perview of the Stat-
utes; that the implied obligations therof could not 
be legally fulfilled by the Court. 
" ( 2) That even assuming said attempted pro-
bation arrangement to be generally valid, the terms 
and conditions thereof as disclosed by the record 
are so lacking and so indefinite and uncertain as to 
be unenforcible" (R. 17). 
The court then ordered that the stay of execution be ex-
tended and continued until June 14, 1960, or until such 
time as the court may determine. This appeal is taken and 
directed to that order of the court denying the issuance of 
the order to show cause. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN PLACING THE 
RESPONDENT UNDER THE CUSTODY AND 
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SUPERVISION OF HIS BONDSMAN, DID NOT 
POSITION THE RESPONDE,NT WITHOUT 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, AND IT 
HAD, THEREFORE, FULL AUT'HORITY TO 
ENTERTAIN AND ISSUE AN ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE, TO TERlVIINATE PROBATION 
THEREAFTER AND COMMIT THE PROBA-
TIONER. 
POINT II. 
EVEN WERE IT ASSUMED THAT THE OR-
DER SUSPENDING EXECUTION OF SEN-
TENCE WAS INVALID, VOID OR UNCER-
TAIN, SUCH ORDER DOES NOT AFFECT THE 
FINALITY OR VALIDITY OF THE JUDG-
MENT AND SENTENCE PREVIOUSLY EN-
TERED BY THE COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE ORDER DENYING THE STATE'S MO-
TlOX FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IS 
TANTAMOUNT TO A PARDON, T'HE RESULT 
OF WHICH LIES WITHOUT THE PROVINCE, 
POvVER OR AUTHORITY OF THE JUDICIARY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN PLACING THE 
RESPONDENT UNDER THE CUSTODY AND 
SUPERVISION OF HIS BONDSMAN, DID NOT 
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POSITION THE RESPO·NDENT WITHOUT 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, AND IT 
HAD, THEREFORE, FULL AUTHORITY TO 
ENTERTAIN AND ISSUE AN ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE, TO TERMINATE PROBATION 
THEREAFTER AND COMMIT THE PROBA-
TIONER. 
The first statement that should be made, and one 
which is subject to little· debate, is that the intention of the 
District Court in suspending execution of sentence was to 
place Chesnut on probation. The pronouncement of the 
court is in every way consistent and in accord with the 
normal and usual address wherein the convicted defendant 
is placed on conditional probation. The language of the 
court is in harmony with no other observation: 
"THE COURT: I will say frankly, this is a 
chance to make good without having to serve time in 
State Prison and if you make good on this, why 
there will be further extensions until you will have 
an opportunity to clear yourself of the matter, but 
that vvill depend on you entirely, of course. We want 
to give you this opportunity rather than to require 
you to serve, * * * 
* * * 
"lVIR. CHAlVI:BERLAIN: Your Honor, I would 
like the record to show that he is under the strict 
supervision and control of his bondsmen with re-
spect to whatever-
"* * * 
"THE COURT: "'rith respect to what he does 
and his course of conduct. That is what I really 
intended-under the control and supervision. 
"* * * 
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"THE COURT: But if the thing is justified, 
we will make the extensions longer. It depends en-
tirely on, I would say, your course of conduct, which 
we hope will be in every way satisfactory" ( R. 23-
24). 
To profess that the intent of the District Court and the 
effect of the afore-quoted language was otherwise than to 
place Chesnut on probation is to admit that the respondent 
is subject to immediate commitment to the State Prison. 
There is no basis to contradict the principle that a dis,trict 
court, in suspending sentence or execution of sentence, must 
proceed under and pursuant to the statutory legislation of 
the State of Utah. 
Justice Hansen, writing for this Court in the case of 
State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044, 1027, stated 
that the district courts of this state have no power to sus-
pend indefinitely execution of sentence. The cases. in the 
State of California are also parallel in effect to that in 
Utah, in holding that the authority of a court to suspend 
the execution of sentence is dependent wholly upon statu-
tory authorization, People v. Brown, 244 P. 2d 702 (Cal. 
App. 1952), that a court has no power to suspend execution 
other than by granting probation, and that an attempt 
of the court to do otherwise is void. People v. Cravens, 251 
P. 2d 717 (Cal. App. 1953). See also In Re Clark, 70 Cal. 
App. 643, 234 Pac. 109. 
The statutes of this state evidence no other conclusion. 
77-35-17, U. C. A. 1953, provides in part: 
"Upon a plea. of guilty or conviction of any 
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the 
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public interest, the court having jurisdiction may 
suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence 
and may place the defendant on probation for such 
period of time as the court shall determine. 
"The court may subsequently increase or de-
crease the probation period, and may revoke or 
modify any condition of probation. * * *" (Em-
phasis added.) 
Once the court determines that it is in the public interest 
to suspend the execution of sentence, probation and pro-
bationary status follow a fortiori. This interpretation is 
cemented by the Z olantakis decision in holding that: 
"Trial courts are not given authority to sus.pend 
sentences as a matter of favor or grace, but only 
when 'it appears compatible with the public inter-
est'." 
In this connection it is well to consider the recent holding 
of Baine v. Beckstead, ... Utah ... , 347 P. 2d 555 (1959), 
wherein it was declared: 
"It is to be kept in mind that deferments of 
commitment of persons convicted of crime are of 
two distinct types: One is probationary, the other 
is not." 
It would be a mistake not to say that the District Court 
intended, as its object in postponing conm1itment under the 
judgment pronounced in the case at bar, to place the re-
spondent on the level of probation with the objective of 
achieving son1e measure of rehabilitation. 
The order of the District Court denying the State's 
motion for an order to show cause as to this respondent 
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indicates that the District Court felt that it no longer had 
jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings relative to the 
probationary status of respondent or subsequent commit-
ment thereunder. After the hearing of January 5, 1960, 
wherein the probationary status was fulfilled, the District 
Court retained and still retains the legal custody of the 
respondent. 77-62-29 sets forth that: 
"The legal custody of all probationers is vested 
in the chief agent and the court having jurisdiction 
of the offender." 
The fact that Chesnut was placed under the custody and 
supervision of his bondsman, Mr. McCarthy, is of no 
moment in considering the primary question of the Dis-
trict Court's jurisdiction to proceed in the case. 
By all odds, the proceedings before the court on Jan-
uary 5, 1960 resulted in Chesnut being placed on probation, 
ho\vever uncertain the terms of probation may have been. 
This \Vas the understanding of the court; it was the under-
standing of the District Attorney; it was the understanding 
of the bondsman, 1.\ir. McCarthy, and it was the understand-
ing of the respondent. Subsequently, it was disclosed to the 
District Attorney by officers of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department that Chesnut was seriously implicated in the 
burglary of a business establishment in Salt Lake City ( R. 
13, 14, 15, 16) on January 26, 1960, barely 21 days, after 
the hearing before the District Court. Such information 
constituted the basis for the motion, upon behalf of the 
State, for an order to show cause why probation should 
not be revoked and commitment issue. Said motion, taken 
together with the accompanying affidavits, is entirely in 
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accord 'vith the procedural steps outlined by this Court as 
a requisite to due process of law: 
"A defendant out of prison on probation is ac-
corded due process of law by the following steps, all 
of which were followed in this case: ( 1) The filing 
of a verified statement or an affidavit in the case 
setting forth facts which show a violation of the 
terms of probation. ( 2) The issuance of an order 
to show cause and citation thereon requiring the 
defendant to appear and show cause why probation 
should not be revoked, apprising defendant of the 
ground or grounds on which revocation is sought, 
and specifying a proper time for hearing. (3) A 
hearing before the court on the question of vio-
lation of some term or condition of probation, at 
which the defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses against him and also to present 
evidence to refute the claimed violation of the con-
dition of probation. ( 4) A determination of the 
question, followed by entry of an appropriate order. 
State v. Zolantakis, supra." (State v. Bonza, 106 
Utah 553, 150 P. 2d 970, (1944). 
The failure, therefore, of the District Court to grant and 
forthwith issue the order to show cause injures and ser-
iously restricts the effective administration of the criminal 
law in this state, and amounts to reversible error subject to 
review by this Court. 
POINT II. 
EVEN WERE IT ASSUMED THAT THE OR-
DER SUSPENDING EXECUTION OF SEN-
TENCE WAS INVALID, VOID OR UNCER-
TAIN, SUCH ORDER DOES NOT AFFECT THE 
FINALITY OR VALIDITY OF THE JUDG-
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MENT AND SENTENCE· PREVIOUSLY EN-
TERED BY THE COURT. 
The order of the District Court in its deferment or stay 
of execution under the judgment, as announced, required 
the respondent to remain within the control and supervision 
of Jack McCarthy, his bondsman. Even were it to be as-
sumed that this segment of the order was ineffective or 
void as being inconsistent and against the provisions of 
77-62-29, U. C. A. 1953, such has no effect upon the validity 
and enforcibility of the valid and enforcible portion of the 
judgment. As to the latter, the judgment and sentence may 
be carried into effect and further proceedings may be had 
relative to the station of the respondent. Reese v. Olsen, 44 
Utah 318, 139 Pac. 941. The Supreme Court of Idaho, in 
passing upon a case of similar identity, stated: 
"* * * By the great weight of authority 
where the court makes an unauthorized order sus-
pending the execution of the sentence imposed by 
the judgment, such order does not prevent the sub-
sequent enforcement of the valid portion of the sen-
tence at a later date." (Ex Parte Jennings, 267 Pac. 
227 (Idaho 1928) . 
The basis for this holding is, of course, that the invalid 
suspension of the execution of sentence in no way affects 
the finality and validity of the judgment of the court, which, 
in this case, imprisoned Chesnut in the State Prison of 
Utah for a term of not less than one nor more than 20 years 
for the crime of second degree burglary, and: for the term 
of not less than one nor more than 10 years for the crime 
of grand larceny, such sentences to be concurrent. 
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The Supreme Court of Colorado, by decision, is also 
devoted to the proposition that the judgment and sentence 
may be executed subsequently notwithstanding a previous 
invalid effort to suspend execution of sentence. In Re 
Nottingham, 268 Pac. 587 (Colo. 1928). Citing 16 C. J., p. 
1335, the Colorado Court said : 
"The invalidity of the attempt to suspend exe-
cution of the sentence does not affect the validity 
of the sentence of imprisonment; that sentence may 
be enforced even after the expiration of the court 
term, and even after the expiration of six months 
from the date of sentence, which was the time of 
imprisonment specified in the sentence." 
The majority rule is also stated as above in 24 C. J. S., Sec. 
1618b(10) (b). 
The District Court is therefore within its province, if 
probation be void or ineffective, to issue a commitment 
forthwith, for the judgment of the District Court can only 
be fulfilled judicially by satisfying its requirements. Ex 
Parte Jennings, supra. 
POINT III. 
THE ORDER DENYING THE STATE'S MO-
TION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IS 
TANTAMOUNT TO A PARDON, THE RESULT 
OF vVHICH LIES WITHOUT THE PROVINCE, 
POvVER OR AUTHORITY OF THE JUDICIARY. 
If the view entertained by the District Court herein 
be accurate with respect to Chesnut in its denial of the 
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State's motion for an order to show cause, and if the court 
fails or refuses to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over 
the respondent, the final product would be to award to 
the latter a pardon of not one, but of both offenses to 
which he had formerly plead guilty. The rule is so well 
established in this state that the pardoning power is the 
exclusive function of the Board of Pardons, that it is only 
for the purpose of the record that authorities be listed. 
Ca.rdisco v. Davis, et al., 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 2d 216; State 
ex rel. Bishop v. State Board of Corrections·, 16 Utah 478, 
52 Pac. 1090; Utah Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 12. As a 
necessary corollary to this principle, State v. Blackburn, 6 
Utah 347, 23 P. 759, holds that the authority to relieve 
:.' a party from the conviction of a crime does not reside with 
the judiciary. 
,, 
I' 
The status of probation which Chesnut has attained 
is not a game of "hide and seek" played by and between the 
State of Utah and the probationer. The underlying theory 
of probation is rehabilitation and establishment as a law-
abiding citizen and is so proclaimed in the Baine and Z olan-
takis cases, supra. In the event that the probationer proves 
unfaithful to his trust and the obligations to the court and 
society, it becomes the duty of the District Court to inquire 
into such unfaithfulness; it would only meet the test of sub-
stantial justice and serve the legitimate enforcement of 
the criminal law in this state for the order of the District 
Court denying the State's motion to be reversed and the 
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings 
under a show cause order. 
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CONCLUSION 
The deferment of execution of sentence as to Sherrill 
Chesnut under proceedings had in open court on January 
5, 1960, effectually placed the latter on probation subject 
to the continuing jurisdiction of the District Court to re-
view, modify or revoke such probation on proper showing. 
Upon application and motion of the District Attorney for 
an order to show cause why further stays should not be 
granted and commitment issue, coupled with the affidavits 
of the officers of the Salt Lake City Police Department, the 
District Court should issue a show cause order as to the 
probationer and inquire into the faithfulness of his conduct. 
If this Court shall determine that the suspended exe-
cution of sentence was void, ineffective, or so uncertain as 
to be unenforcible, then the District Court should be di-
rected to order that the respondent be committed to the 
State Prison, State of Utah, pursuant to and in accordance 
with the judgment and sentence of the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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